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INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States was an early leader in the history of the global electronics sector. 
Success in technology had strong implications for national security, political influence, and 
economic growth. Thus, there is much value to be gained in understanding the conditions of the 
early U.S. electronics sector development.  
It is suggested from background materials that government support was an important, 
possibly essential, force in the evolution of the electronics sector. The influence of the federal 
government on the development of the industry has been attributed to a variety of mechanisms 
from antitrust to intellectual property policies but prominence is usually assigned to the funds 
that the US government provided to the business sector in the form of R&D funding and 
procurement contracts. As Mowery and Nelson (1999) put it: “[v]irtually all accounts of the rise 
to dominance of the American semiconductor and computer industries … emphasize the 
procurement and R&D policies of the U.S. Department of Defense.” Of the two policies, 
procurement arises as the more influential factor. 
With these accounts in mind, I further research the extent, nature, and impact of defense 
procurement on the electronics sector and companies during the 1950-1970s time period. 
Analysis of historical primary texts and secondary sources reveal that defense procurement 
consistently constituted a large percentage of GNP over this time period. Examination of the 
nature of defense including the types of contracts available and the goals that policymakers were 
concerned with, show us some of the reasons how and why procurement was able to play such 
important roles. We learned that electronic content was procured as part of several procurement 
programs and made up a significant portion of total awarded contracts. From the electronic 
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industries’ perspective, sales to the government were discovered to make up half or more of total 
electronics sales. These sales were highly concentrated to the top companies but procurement 
policies often made a deliberate effort to support small businesses.  
On an industry-level, the government’s influence was large and important, but was an 
individual company that participated in defense procurement better off or more successful in the 
future than a comparable firm that didn’t? Although defense sales clearly provided often much-
needed revenue to firms along with other benefits, not all remarks about the role of defense 
procurement in previous scholarly discussion have been positive. I reviewed some of the 
arguments from both sides and next proceeded to search for quantitative evidence to back up 
these qualitative observations. Finally, finding unsatisfactory to non-existent quantitative 
evidence, I identified approaches to gather the necessarily procurement and financial firm-level 
data from various primary sources in order to model and test relationships between participation 
in defense contracting and later company success.
 BACKGROUND 
Definition 
Electronics is defined as “the science dealing with the development and application of 
devices and systems involving the flow of electrons in a vacuum, in gaseous media, and in 
semiconductors.” Electronic devices allow for conversion and distribution of power as well as 
control and processing of data. It includes both components and end products. A classification of 
electronics is provided below. Outlined in the 1970s, it is appropriate for our historical study and 
still quite relevant today (Tilton 1971). 
 
Figure 1: Classification of Electronics Products 
Source: Tilton (1971) 
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Importance 
Today’s information technology industries include electronics and, industries such as 
software and the Internet, those directly made possible by electronics. According to the 2002 US 
Economic Census, 4.5 million people in the United States were employed in IT  manufacturing 
and IT services. It is still the fastest growing sector of the economy today, contributing more than 
$1 trillion in revenue every year to GDP. 
In addition to the direct economic benefits that electronics have brought to the nation’s 
economy, they are an input into almost every other facet of American industries and businesses. 
The productivity impact of this is vast, but difficult to measure. One conservative estimate 
attributes 64% of total factor productivity growth in as recent as 1995-2000 to information 
technology advances which have been made possible by semiconductors and computers 
(Jorgenson et al. 2002). As consumers, we have come to rely on common personal consumer 
electronics products such as laptops, cell phones, mp3 music players, etc. for convenient 
communication and gathering and processing of information.  
In another crucial application, the contributions of electronics firms were vital to the 
strength of the country’s national defense. With the increasing role of sophisticated weapons, 
planes, ships, and other military implements through the 20th century, it was acknowledged with 
the creation of ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency), now DARPA, that maintaining a 
lead in applying state-of-the-art technology for military capabilities was a high priority and a 
centerpiece of military strategy. In turn, due to this dependent relationship, as we will see, the 
military played an important part shaping the development of the electronics sector. 
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Researching the conditions and reasons for the success of the U.S. electronics sector is 
important for intellectual and scholarly purposes because it adds to a greater understanding in 
economics about technology industries, role of governments, and innovation. It should also be of 
interest to historians as the story of the historical development of the electronics industry is an 
integral part of the story of the United States as a whole. 
Finally, and possibly most importantly, for the same reasons that we study economics and 
history in general, it is recognized that as the United States seeks to maintain leadership and 
success in technology, “business leaders, policymakers, and university researchers will need to 
understand the sources of their past success.” (Funding a Revolution 1999) The lessons of the 
past including any generalizations of phenomenon or assessments on the efficacy of past policies 
can provide valuable insights to be used when developing future policies and strategies so that 
the same success can be replicated. 
 
Historical Context 
 
Figure 2: Total Sales of Electronics Products (1914-1972) 
Source: Data collected from Electronic Industries Yearbook (1962-1972)
It can be said that the origin of the electronics sector began with the invention of the radio 
in the late 19th century. Vacuum tubes were developed in 1915 and were used in early electronic 
devices such as radios, televisions, and early computers. ENIAC, the first general purpose 
electronic digital computer, was finished in 1946 at University of Pennsylvania. Although the 
ENIAC still used vacuum tube technology, at around the same time, transistors, a type of 
semiconductor device, were invented and would replace vacuum tubes in electronic devices as 
they were smaller, cheaper, more reliable, and had a longer life.   
As seen from the chart, based on data collected from the 1962 through 1972 issues of 
Electronics Industries Yearbook, sales in the electronics sector only truly began taking off during 
World War II in the 1940s. The industries continued their exponential growth into the Cold War 
era. In 1959, integrated circuits were invented which allowed for the integration of transistors 
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into a small chip and could be reliably mass produced. Thus it makes sense to focus on the time 
period of 1950-1970 as they prove to be the important formative years of the electronics sector.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing body of knowledge about the historical development of electronics include 
histories of individual technologies or industries such as the computer or the radio as well as of 
prominent companies such as IBM. Scholars have also done comparison work on individual 
industries, contrasting them with the development of the same sectors in other countries. It has 
been found that industries evolved differently in accordance with the situations, resources, and 
opportunities available as well as deliberate choices that governments and firms have made. I 
will attempt to review some of the specific factors deemed important to the success and 
evolution of the U.S. electronics sector that have been explored or remarked upon by scholars. 
Mowery and Nelson (1999) contend that in some cases, American companies allowed 
liberal licensing policies that helped diffuse technology among companies. To illustrate, the 
transistor was invented at AT&T’s Bell Laboratories and Western Electric, an affiliate of Bell 
Laboratories, began commercial production soon thereafter. However, AT&T was generous with 
allowing cross-licensing agreements and this action is recognized for enabling an early 
widespread diffusion that was key to the success of the U.S. semiconductor industry. AT&T’s 
vice president said at the time, “We realized that if this thing [the transistor] was as big as we 
thought, we couldn’t keep it to ourselves and we couldn’t make all the technical contributions. It 
was to our interest to spread it around.” New entrants soon undertook production of transistors as 
well and continued researching improvements and ways to commercialize the new technology. 
Indeed when Jack Kilby at Texas Instruments and Robert Noyce at Fairchild concurrently 
invented the integrated circuit, their two companies, continuing in the tradition of AT&T, forged 
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a cross-licensing agreement that gave them joint claim on the invention and diffused the 
innovation to the rest of the industry. 
In historical works such as Campbell-Kelly and Aspray (2004) and Flamm (1988), the 
authors remind us that early computer models such as Harvard’s Mark I and University of 
Pennsylvania’s ENIAC were the result of university research. Lessons learned from both of these 
computers would be incorporated into later successful commercial computers produced by IBM 
and UNIVAC (soon acquired by giant Sperry Rand). 
In addition to inventing new technologies, universities were also responsible for 
educating the next generation of scientists and engineers to provide talent and training for the 
burgeoning technology industries. In software especially, Mowery and Langlois (1996) argue 
that the university system and the creation of the academic discipline of computer science was 
extremely important. Universities were also the site of large projects that provided ample 
opportunities for people to gain experience. In the software industry, Project Whirlwind at MIT 
was responsible for the SAGE air defense system and this project was so large that it was noted 
that, “the chances are reasonably high that on a large data processing job in the 1970s you would 
find at least one person who had worked with the SAGE system.” 
Universities also helped diffuse knowledge by formally publishing research and 
informally sharing ideas. Again in the example of the computer industry, the famous Moore 
School lectures were held from July 8, 1946 – August 31, 1946 soon after ENIAC was finished 
and invited scientists from around the world to learn about the groundbreaking work that had just 
been completed. Attendees such as Maurice Wilkes of Cambridge University then went back to 
their respective institutions to continue work in the field. Cambridge University’s EDSAC 
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computer was completed in 1949. Indeed, John Mauchly, one of the creators of ENIAC, had 
himself spent several days with Professor John Atanasoff at Iowa State University learning about 
their earlier Atanasoff-Berry Computer. (Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, 2004) 
It is impossible to overlook the government’s influence underlying both the actions of 
enterprises and universities. Mowery and Nelson praised AT&T’s supposedly benevolent and 
prudent decision to cross-license the transistor. However, as another side to the story, Tilton 
(1971) argues that fears of inciting the U.S. government’s antitrust scrutiny were another 
motivation for AT&T and other companies to adopt liberal licensing policies. Flamm (1987) 
concurs that “antitrust pressure on IBM continued to affect IBM’s actions vis-à-vis its 
competitors in the 1960s and 1970s.” Flamm (1987) also brings up fiscal assistance, 
government-supported joint ventures, government standards,  and intellectual property protection 
as mechanisms that the government influenced electronics industries, but even in his view, they 
are minor compared to R&D support and procurement, two of the most widely recognized 
influential government mechanisms on electronics. 
Mowery and Langlois (1996) recognize the importance of federal funding of university 
research from agencies such as Department of Defense and ARPA (Advanced Research Projects 
Agency) in software. Tilton (1971) discovers that government-sponsored R&D constituted 
almost a quarter of all semiconductor industry R&D in the late 1950s. In an industry with such 
high R&D requirements and difficult recovering those costs, Flamm (1987) says, “There is a 
general tendency to underinvest in research. Economists of all stripes generally support some 
degree of government involvement in encouraging research, particularly basic research (arguably 
the most difficult to appropriate for private use).” In another work, Flamm (1988) notes that 
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another feature is that “the military budget is largely immune from the philosophical and 
ideological passions raised by arguments about the role of government in the economy. One 
recurring phenomenon has been the sheltering of research programs under the protective wings 
of the military service.” 
However, most also agree that one of the major limitations of direct R&D funding was 
that it tended to only go to large companies. Mowery and Nelson (1999) wrote that, “In 1959, for 
example, Western Electric and eight established vacuum-tube firms received 78% of the 
government’s R&D funding despite accounting for only half of private R&D activity in the 
industry and only 37% of semiconductor sales. By contrast, the military was far less biased 
toward established firms in its role as a buyer: in the same year, new firms accounted for 63% of 
all semiconductor sales, but 69% of sales to the military.” 
It is also not even true that government-sponsored R&D were successful in churning out 
the great, industry-moving inventions. As a different argument against the efficacy of 
government R&D funding, Mowery and Nelson (1999) claim that, “These R&D and production-
development activities were not as effective in pushing the industry along as were the fact and 
extent of government demand itself. All the major breakthroughs in transistors were developed 
privately with the military market (among others) in mind.” In fact, wasting companies’ time 
with non-commercially viable R&D projects diverted the firms from other potentially profitable 
ventures. Government-sponsored R&D programs regarding miniaturization implemented at 
Westinghouse by the Air Force and RCA by the Army were ultimately failures and “may have 
contributed to their falling behind in the IC era.” 
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It is government procurement that rises to the top as most influential. Mowery and 
Nelson (1999) consider “procurement demand [to be] arguably the most important – and the 
most salutary – aspect of government policy.” Tilton (1971) agrees that it was “particularly 
important [especially for] new firms.” While the high technology Silicon Valley industries are 
proud of their entrepreneurial roots supposedly unfettered by government interference, Thomas 
Heinrich (2002) sets the record straight by reminding us that the government purchased a wide 
variety of Silicon Valley products and, through this, influenced company strategies and 
organizations. His study included microwave electronics, missiles, satellites, space electronics, 
and semiconductor industries. 
Flamm (1987) focused on the advancement of particular technologies in his analysis of 
the computer industry and is able to point out that 19 out of 25 principle innovations in the 
computing industry had first sales to the government.  
This review of some of the relevant past literature suggests that studying procurement is 
one worthwhile avenue to explore when seeking answers about the success of the U.S. 
electronics sector. We would want to know what the entire extent of the government 
procurement spending on electronics firms was, first from on aggregate-level and then on firm-
specific level if possible, especially for those small firms we know are so important and what 
makes procurement funding more influential than R&D. This information is difficult to obtain, 
which is why most prior work taken a qualitative case-based approach or by examining data on 
only the largest companies. We begin our exploration by searching out historical primary sources 
as well as helpful secondary sources in order to paint the fullest picture of what government 
procurement looked like in the 1950-70s. The results are what follow in the next section.
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
Magnitude 
 
Figure 3: National Security Expenditures (1939-1959) 
Source: Novick & Springer (1959) 
 
Figure 4: DoD Procurement Awards (1951-1964) 
Source: Baldwin (1967) 
As can be expected, national security expenditures rose to almost 40% of GNP during the 
World War II years, but, strikingly, they remained high afterwards, especially compared to their 
pre-World War II levels. Procurement awards, a component of national security expenditures, 
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also consistently made up a significant percentage of GNP. Even after dropping off in 1954, 
defense procurement still made up around 5% of GNP every year which amounted to $20-30 
billion, which clearly made it a sizeable economic force to be reckoned with in its own right. 
This was due to military preparedness build up in light of the Cold War situation. Electronics 
expenditures were especially thrust into the spotlight after the Soviet Union scored a victory in 
launching Sputnik in 1957. The Korean and Vietnam Wars from 1950-1953 and 1959-1975 
respectively also kept defense contractors busy with the military’s demand for products. 
Goals 
The institution of government procurement is unique in its goals and practices, so it is 
worthwhile to take a closer look at the “nature of the beast.” Unlike profit-seeking entities, the 
goals that a government procurement office pursues are more complex. Five main goals of the 
government in procurement can be described by the following:  
1. Fulfillment of requirements: To insure that resources are allocated to satisfy the 
legitimate requirements of the military establishment; and that it receives goods and 
services of the volume and quality and at the time and place needed. 
2. Efficient production: To insure that resources including labor, materials and facilities are 
used efficiently in the production of both military and civilian goods. 
3. Budgetary economy: To insure that military requirements are supplied at a minimum 
budgetary cost to the government. 
4. Economic stabilization: To support so far as possible the objectives of the economic 
stabilization. 
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5. Sociopolitical objectives: To promote unity of purpose within the nation and with our 
allies, and to preserve and strengthen our democratic institutions. 
(Miller 1952) 
In order for a product to be requisitioned, it had to go through an extensive approval process. 
After being justifying a purchase as necessary to national defense, the procurement officer was 
not likely to come back empty-handed because of cost considerations. Although efficient 
production and budgetary economy were goals as well, they were secondary. It was a very 
unsettling and politically disastrous idea that the lives of American soldiers and citizens 
depended on weapons and equipment manufactured by the lowest bidder.  
To explain the goal of economic stabilization further, given that the magnitude of 
procurement was such that it made procurement a significant economic force, the government 
tried not to disrupt the normal operations of the economy too much in diverting consumer or 
industrial production towards military needs. Sociopolitical objectives were those such as 
preference to small businesses and disadvantaged areas and were even more of a unique 
characteristic which will have important ramifications later.  
 
Prime Contracts vs. Subcontracts 
 
Figure 5: DoD Prime and Subcontracts 
Source: Data collected from Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments (1961) 
It is important to distinguish between prime contracts versus subcontracts. Firms that sell 
their goods and services directly to the government receive prime contracts. There were also 
subcontractors that sell to prime contractors. The prime contractors, in a sense, could outsource 
parts of the project out to smaller or more specialized firms. However, large companies could be 
and often were simultaneously prime contractors as well as subcontractors on other projects. The 
total amount of subcontracts awarded tended to equal around 35% of the total amount of prime 
contracts awarded for our time period for a total value of around $10-15 billion. 
Other Contract Types 
Competitive vs. Non-competitive 
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Contracts were competitive or non-competitive. Of the competitive contracts, these could 
be formally advertised or the result of a price or technical design competition. However, 60-70% 
were non-competitive. These were negotiated and resulted from situations such as if a firm had 
previously conducted R&D on the desired product or was the only one with the expertise to 
produce it efficiently.  
Pricing Provisions 
60-80% of all contracts were fixed price type contracts. The rest were cost reimbursement 
and other types. Cost-plus contracts were useful in mitigating the risk associated with 
undertaking more innovative production. Under cost-plus contracts, the client pays for all of the 
associated costs plus some margin for compensation. This pushes the risk of cost and time 
overruns (which are particularly common and concerning in the development of technology 
products) onto the government, making a firm more likely to accept such an undertaking. 
EDT&R Contracts 
15-20% of total contracts or around $5-6 billion were Research, Development, Testing, & 
Evaluation Work (RDT&E) contracts with the vast majority classified as “Development” work 
as opposed to “Research” or “Management and Support”. Unsurprisingly, more than half of 
these awards went towards missile systems, ~20% to electronics and communications, and also 
ships and ammunition whereas very little went towards less cutting-edge items such as clothing. 
 
Small Business 
 
Figure 6: Small Business Procurement Awards 
Source: Data collected from Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments (1961) 
Encouraging small business participation was extremely important politically and was the 
subject of countless Congressional studies and hearings. The Small Business Act of 1953 read, 
“It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and 
protect insofar as is possible the interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free 
competitive enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of total purchases and contracts for 
supplies and services for the Government be placed with small-business enterprises, and to 
maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation.”  
As economists looking at the development of industries, inclusion of small businesses is 
important because small businesses serve as a vehicle for new inventions and diffusion of 
knowledge, they keep competition healthy and force existing companies to keep innovating, and 
successful ones become tomorrow’s big companies. 
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Small businesses generally received around $4-8 billion in prime contracts. They also 
received only a little less in subcontracts, around $3.5-6.5 billion. As a percentage of total 
awards, 17-18% of prime contracts were awarded to small businesses while, as a drastic 
improvement, around 40% of subcontracts were awarded to small businesses. In accordance with 
previous criticisms about the restrictiveness of R&D funding to small firms, small businesses 
only received 3-5% of RDT&E contracts. For a while, it was thought that small businesses 
benefited from advertised contracts and Congress sought to make those more available in order 
to encourage small business participation. Instead, it was found that it was difficult for small 
businesses to compete on advertised contracts and small business owners themselves preferred 
negotiated contracts. (Baldwin 1967) 
 
PROCUREMENT OF ELECTRONICS 
DoD Procurement Programs 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of Electronics by Procurement Program (1963, 1972) 
Source: Data collected from Electronics Industries Yearbook (1962-1972) 
  
Government procurement was divided into 13 different procurement programs, each 
responsible for a different category of products. Electronics were procured through not only the 
Electronics and Communications procurement program, but significant portions of electronic 
content were procured from the Missile Systems, Aircraft, and Ships procurement programs as 
well as, to a lesser extent. the Ordnance, Vehicles, etc. and Other programs. The two snapshots 
above taken from 1963 and 1972 show that these portions remained relatively constant. 
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 Figure 8: % of Procurement Program Consisting of Electronic Content 
Source: Data collected from Electronics Industries Yearbook (1962-1972) 
 
Figure 9: Total Electronics Procurement from DoD Prime Contracts 
Source: Data collected from Electronics Industries Yearbook (1962-1972) and Military Prime Contracts and 
Subcontract Payments (1961) 
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The fact that electronics procurement is spread out among procurement programs makes 
determining the total size of electronics procurement more complicated. The EIA reported 
electronics procurement in total and also broken down by procurement program  for 1963-1972, 
but I had to estimate the earlier years when only the total was available. Since the % contribution 
of each procurement program maintains fairly stable trends over the known time period, I 
conducted a linear regression on the known points and extrapolated back to determine the % 
electronic content of each procurement program in 1955-1962. The total amount of prime 
contracts awarded through each procurement program is available for those years, so I multiplied 
that number by my calculated % of electronic content to obtain an overall figure for prime 
contract awards for electronics products. 
 
Figure 10: Electronics as % of Total Procurement 
Source: Data collected from Electronics Industries Yearbook (1962-1972) and Military Prime Contracts and 
Subcontract Payments (1961) 
As a percentage of total defense procurement, electronics made up on average 15% of 
total procurement. 
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Importance to Electronics Sector 
To examine the situation from the other, more telling perspective of the electronics 
industries and companies themselves, I needed to determine how important government sales 
were to the electronics sector. 
 
Figure 11: Total Sales of Electronics by Category 
Source: Data collected from Electronics Industries Yearbook (1962-1972) 
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Figure 12: Military and Space Product Sales as % of Total Electronics Sales 
Source: Data collected from Electronics Industries Yearbook (1962-1972) 
In general, military and space products sold to the government made up a significant 
portion of total electronics sales. Military and space product sales made up of as much as 60% of 
total industry sales in this time period. Sales of military and space products were higher than that 
of both consumer and industrial products for the entire two decades of the 1950s and 1960s 
before industrial products finally overtook military and space products in 1970.  
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 Figure 13: DoD Procurement as % of Total Electronics Sales 
Source: Data collected from Electronics Industries Yearbook (1962-1972) and Military Prime Contracts and 
Subcontract Payments (1961) 
Excluding NASA, R&D contracts, etc, strictly defense procurement made up as much as 
40% of total electronics sales in the early years, but still as much as 20% into the late 1960s. 
Concentration of Firms Receiving Procurement Funds 
Prime contracts were generally highly concentrated to the largest firms and it was no 
different in electronics. There were usually 17-18 electronics companies among the 50 largest 
prime contractors and they made up around 20% of total prime contracts. A cursory examination 
of the top hundred or so electronics companies in 1966 revealed that they had all received prime 
procurement contracts in that year. 
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 Figure 14: Prime Contracts to Small Business 
Source: Data collected from Military Prime Contracts and Subcontract Payments (1961) 
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 Figure 15: % of Prime Contracts to Small Business by Procurement Program 
Source: Data collected from Military Prime Contracts and Subcontract Payments (1961) 
Small businesses received 10% of Electronics & Communication Equipment category 
prime contracts. This seems disappointingly small when compared to all small businesses which 
received an average of 18% of prime contracts during the same time period, but we must 
remember that this overall number is increased by categories such as subsistence, textiles, 
clothing, and construction which are naturally more amenable to small business participation. 
Subcontracts could not be broken down by procurement program, so all we know is that 
the small business share of subcontracts was generally twice as much as their share of prime 
contracts. 
28 
 
29 
 
FIRM-LEVEL CONSEQUENCES OF PARTICIPATION IN PROCUREMENT 
 
While it is clear now that government procurement demand played an enormous role in 
the early electronics market, we now want to ask about specific firm-level consequences. Was a 
company better off by having participated in the defense contracting program? Past research has 
touched upon the question of consequences of procurement in the form of case studies on 
companies and industries. I review some of these comments below. 
Positive Consequences 
As is clear from the previous section, procurement demand constituted a large and 
growing market that sustained electronics industries and firms through the decades when 
commercial and industrial markets were still small. Tilton (1971) wrote that “most new 
semiconductor devices first find a home in military products… within a few years, the price is 
low enough to penetrate the industrial market, and eventually the consumer market.” Profits from 
defense contracts financed company operations as well as funded a company’s internal R&D 
projects. Compounded by this indirect effect, the impact of defense procurement was even larger. 
The government was uniquely positioned to play this early adopter role because, thinking 
back to the stated goals of defense procurement, cost was less of a concern. An Assistant 
Secretary of Defense said, “Cost, even though given active and sympathetic recognition, tends to 
assume a secondary role.” Cost was especially forced to be subordinate to other considerations 
when the Department of Defense placed such priority on acquiring highly innovative products. 
Baldwin (1967) in his analysis of the defense market explains this fixation with cutting-edge 
technology in that, to the military, “technological advance is frequently viewed as more of an 
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end in itself.” Demonstrated technological ability might discourage potential enemies, especially 
in the Cold War political atmosphere. Technical superiority in weapons could literally mean the 
difference between life and death, thus the military was willing to pay a lot for even small 
improvements. This is in contrast to civilian markets where commercial R&D pays off only after 
new products are accepted by consumers and profitably sold and/or cost reductions from more 
efficient production processes are realized. In this sense, the government was a crucial early 
customer to have. 
Government emphasis on quality and reliability also forced firms to turn out quality 
products and to improve manufacturing processes in order to do so. When Fairchild booked a 
$1.5 million contract for work on the Minuteman intercontinetal ballistic missile, “the firm vastly 
improved its manufacturing processes to mee the stringent quality requirements of the 
Minuteman reliability improvement program” and this “commitment to reliability became a 
major asset when the copany entered civilian markets in the 1960s.” (Lecuyer, 2000) 
Finally, to the small business owner, the defense market was more open to small business 
than consumer or industrial markets given political pressures to favor small business when 
possible although there was a prohibition against paying premium prices. Baldwin (1967) also 
reviewed small business policies. Each department had an Office of Small Business with small 
business specialists to suggest contracts suitable for small business as well as specific contractors. 
Prime contractors were also forced to provide opportunities for small business subcontracting 
when appropriate. 
Negative Consequences 
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Some firms, especially specialized defense contractors, experienced an enormous amount 
of dependence on one customer: the government. This was unhealthy in two ways. Due to highly 
politicized decision-making, the defense budget experienced fluctuations. Heinrich (2002) tells 
the sad tale of Varian Associates, a klystron and microwave tube manufacturer, whose sales to 
the government accounted for 65% of business volume. When the Pentagon temporarily reduced 
its purchases of those products in 1963, the company reported a $1 million loss in 1964, 
throwing the company’s financial situation into agitation. Unable to successfully diversify 
afterwards, industry analysts deemed Varian’s earnings a “never-ending horror story.” However, 
this is only one example and it is difficult to disaggregate the effects of the defense budget cuts 
with other factors such as poor company management. 
The negative side of the government’s demand for cutting-edge products and unconcern 
for costs was that by emphasizing technical prowess instead of cost efficiency and having very 
specific demands, the companies found it difficult to compete later on in commercial markets. 
Heinrich (2002) notes that military satellite builders rarely succeeded in civilian markets. Indeed, 
as military needs and consumer needs diverged, increasingly fewer externalities could be gained 
from past military contract work. Limited incentive and scope to develop capabilities in areas 
like marketing and production also inhibited transfer of success to other markets. 
Contracting with the government demands so much paperwork that the bookkeeping 
costs are nontrivial. Baldwin (1967) says that “a contractor must have substantial manpower and 
capital tied up in keeping special records, gathing information, and preparing reports.” For all of 
the conscious efforts to encourage small business, it is possible that they could not overcome 
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these and other barriers of entry to small firms. Bureaucratic “red tape” is also annoying and 
costly to deal with. 
However, Baldwin actually believes that “the single most important aspect of the 
Relationship [between the contractor and the government]… is embodied in the Department of 
Defense policies regarding rights to data.” Companies faced the loss of patent rights, trade 
secrets, and proprietary data. Subcontractors especially complained about prime contractors 
infringing on their patents. Companies did not mind so much furnishing information to the 
government, but were more concerned by having to provide information to other firms either in 
the bidding process or as their subcontractor because they would have to turn around and 
compete against them at a later time.
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FURTHER ANALYSIS 
As seen from the previous section, accounts of the consequences of defense participation 
are mixed. It is unclear whether the positive consequences outweigh the negative and difficult to 
gauge the relative importance of the many factors. I would like to see some comprehensive 
quantitative firm-level evidence on the consequences of procurement, but unfortunately the 
existing evidence is extremely limited. Existing studies focus only on the largest electronics 
companies for which data is more readily available.  
For example, although he does not focus on electronics companies, Baldwin (1967) 
analyzes the largest 50 companies that received prime contract awards which includes 18 
companies that primarily sold electronics products. He conducts a financial analysis of ROA, 
ROE, and net sales and, among his findings, learns that companies that participated in the 
defense market received comparable returns to the average American manufacturing firm. He 
also conducts an interesting study comparing returns based on degree of firm specialization in 
defense sales. The sample of companies in Baldwin’s study was too limited to draw any broad 
conclusions for our purposes, but these and more rigorous types of analyses can shed more light 
on the question  in order to reach a more definitive answer. 
Except for some claims from industry studies (e.g. semiconductors) I have been able to 
find no systematic evidence on the effects of government procurement on electronics companies 
that includes smaller companies outside the top 100. An ideal analysis would require firm-level 
data on procurement awards be broken down into prime and subcontracts by firm as well as 
financial data on the characteristics and performance of these firms in order to find relationships 
between the two. Since no such analysis has ever been done, I must identify and compile new 
data and have come up with two different strategies for doing so. 
Compiling Firm-Level Data 
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Procurement Data 
Procurement data needs to be 
compiled in order to systematically 
identify every company that received 
procurement funding including 
electronics companies. Procurement 
data by firm is available from 
Department of Defense. It includes all 
prime contracts issued and includes 
useful information such as dates, contractor name, place of performance, dollar value of contract, 
type of service rendered, type of contract signed, and whether or not the business was small or 
disadvantaged. However, it is only readily available for 1966 on. Attempts to locate pre-1966 
data through inquiry to the Department of Defense and National Archives have been thus far 
unsuccessful. This data set also omits subcontracts. Trade journals, notably Electronic News, are 
another source. Electronic News published major and other contract awards in its weekly section 
on Defense. It includes basic information on name of company, dollar value of contract, service 
to be rendered, and branch of the military that requisitioned it. However, they do not purport to 
offer complete coverage and this is also seemingly limited to subcontracts.  
Figure 16: Sample of Electronic News data 
Source: Electronic News January 1966 
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Financial Data 
The second necessity is financial data in order to relate procurement contracts with 
financial performance. Financial performance data and importance of government as a customer 
can be compiled from prospectuses issued to the SEC. These are available for all electronics 
companies that have completed public issues of securities. Close to a thousand companies issued 
securities and data on these companies including names, size, year of establishment have already 
compiled by Prof. O’Sullivan from Investment Dealers’ Digest. Historical prospectuses and 
other filings submitted to the SEC are now stored in the National Archives in Maryland and it 
has been determined that there are 11,000 boxes of them,  organized based on obscure SEC-
designated codes which are needed to access them. We have established that an “accession log” 
exists which should allow us to match company name to SEC code but would have to persuade 
the SEC to provide matches for all of the companies needed. The limitation to this approach is 
that it is confined only to publicly traded companies. Although the financial data they contain are 
not as complete, industry directories like Electronics’ Buyers Guide can provide some cursory 
data on private companies. 
Modeling the Relationship between Procurement and Performance 
 Having these supplementary data would allow me to test and reveal positive or negative 
relationships with the later success of the firm. Success is difficult to measure, but can be defined 
by: 
• Revenue during the year measured, 5 years later, 10 years later, etc. 
• Net income, operating margin 
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• Return on assets, return on equity 
• Share price for publicly traded companies 
• Number of patents 
• Longevity of the company before it becomes bankrupt or acquired. 
I would set each of these as a dependent variable against a measure of dependence on 
government sales (% of government sales to total sales). Confounding factors such as size, age, 
or previous success of companies would need to be held constant. 
Since it was suggested that the fluctuations in defense budgets adversely impacted 
companies, if this ends up being true and significant, we would expect to see poorer returns or 
stock performance for more government-dependent companies than average in lean budget years. 
The magnitude of disparity between the two would also give an indication of how important this 
phenomenon was. 
For those interested in specific companies, I could also track the amount of procurement 
awards received by a given company over the years and perhaps map any successful transitions 
to the consumer market (by increases in advertising expenses and decreases in dependency on 
government sales). 
 Although we already have a pretty good idea about the importance of government 
funding to the entire industry, a comprehensive firm-level dataset would also allow me to go 
back and answer other questions about extent of participation in procurement in the electronics 
sector more satisfactorily than with the previous aggregate data. For example, out of X 
electronics companies total, exactly Y participated in defense contracting this year.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The remarkable success of the early U.S. electronics sector has understandably prompted 
academics and policymakers alike to research the causes of this success. After examination of 
past literature, many sources were discussed but government procurement stood out as quite 
possibly the most important factor. This prompted my study where I went back to the 1950-
1970s time period and examined primary government and electronics industry sources in order to 
confirm and shed more light on the role of government procurement in the early electronics 
sector.  
We learned that the nature and goals of defense procurement were well-suited to play a 
pivotal role in the growth of the electronics sector as the government emerged as a buyer willing 
and able to take chances on many expensive electronics products and untried small businesses. 
At a time fraught with political and military turbulence, around 5% of GNP was consistently and 
solely spent on defense procurement awards. Armed with this enormous amount of funding 
available, we estimated that sales from defense procurement prime contracts made up 20-40% of 
total sales in the electronics sector which is a significant figure.  
There is certainly room for further investigation on the topic especially in sifting through 
the various firm-level consequences for participating in defense procurement programs. Analyses 
in this direction require a comprehensive firm-level dataset that does not currently exist and must 
be compiled from scratch. I have generally outlined an approach to do it. It is a challenging and 
still imperfect task, but promises even more answers as the next step to this study.
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